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The process of economh development, pknned or otherwise, involves,
among other things ~ the ways by whhh a country mobilizes available re-
.
‘L sources to generate greater total wealth and to aoMeve some expressed
pattern of distribution of this nmv wealth among regions and classes of
people. How the twin objeotfves of growth snd distribution are achieved
and the relative importance assfgmd to each will vary among nations at any
point in time as WOIIas through time for a particular natio%
The ways by which a country mobilirms its resources for development
depend upon a number of faotoxw: the quantity and quality of land and other natural
resources, labor, and oapital avsjlable to it; the nature of saWngs(including foreign
~/ Paper presented at the Seminar on Inoome Distribution in India, sponsored
by the Planning Unit of the Indian StatistimO Institute, New Delhi, February
25-26, 1971.
* Program Advisor in Economics, The Ford Foundation, Nw Delhi, India,-2-
sources of funds) and the ways it invests these savings; the level and
composition of demands, both domestic snd foreign, for final snd inter-
mediate products which can be produced from the available resources;
.
the set of beliefs and values widely held by society which Influence not
only the demand and supply of‘commodities and services, but also deter-
mine the institutional structure governing economic and social activity --
rules by,which society organizes itself to pursue accepted objectives; the
distribution of income and wealth that flows from production; and finally,
the extent to which technology can slter the effective resource endowment
of a country. Planning of economic development, whether done formally
or informally, should deal with all of the above factors acting upon a
country’s development process. It goes without saying, however, that
this is not always the case.
How well a nation mobilizes itself for development can be inferred
from its development plans and policies, or lack of them, and how well the
objectives of these plans and policies are pursued and achieved through
, programs of action, I will argue in this paper that the merits of a
particular set of policies snd programs, such as those comprising the
New Agricultural Strategy, should be evaluated in terms of what they were
designed to accomplish; no more, no less. However, if a program has
adverse effects on other national goals, this must be considered as one-3-
of the costs of the program. Such external effects should always be
considered when evaluating a program. I will argue further that it is
futile to impute objectives to policies and programs that are not part of
the basic policy and program design, It is not necessary for anY parti-
cular set of policies and programs to deal with all the objectives a
country sets for itself; rather, achievement of objectives must be viewed
in terms of the collective outcome of all policies and programs.
The New Agricultural Strategy
Nature and Objectives
The set of policies and programs that are conveniently called
the New Agricultural Strategy have come in for a growing measure of
criticism on two counts. .First, there are some who feal that the present
policy and program structure will not yield desired rates of growth in
agricultural output. Second, there is a growing concern that the benefits
of the growth in agricultural output is concentrated in the hands of certain
classes of people and in certain regions, leaving large groups of people .
in the backwaters of development. I would like to put the New Agricultural
Strategy in an historical perspective before commenting on these two sets
of criticisms.-4-
Specifically, the New Agricultural Strategy to which I refer was
adopted and put into action in 1965-66, It consisted of a package of
measures designed to get the quickest possible increase in food grain
production and consisted of incentive prices to farmers and the concen-
tration of the use of new, high-yielding varieties of wheat, rice and
maize (and later, jowar and bajra), fertilizer, and plant protection
matefials on an estimated 32 million acres of land which had an
“assured!’ supply of water. It was a strategy born out of acute food
~/
shcmtsges with the attendant upward spiraling of food prioes.
This was not the first time in the recent history of India when
food shortages and a strong emphasis on increasing food production in
the most expeditious manner was a matter of national conce= me
can go back in history at least to the 1940’s and the Grow-More-Food
Campaign. Less remote in time, the decline in food grain production
@ 1957-58 raised some doubts about whether production was growing
rapidly enough to meet the countries future needs. This concern was
translated into a study of the nation’s food situation which was published
~/
in 1959 under the title, Report on India’s Food Crisis and Steps to Meet It,
fJ/ C. Subramaniam, “India’s Program for Agricultural Progress”, Strate~
for the Conquest of Hunger Proceedings of a Symposium Convened by the
Rockefeller Foundation$ The Rockefeller Foundation, New York, Apr. 1988.
~/ Report on India’s Food Crisis and Steps to Meet It, by the Agricultural
Production Team sponsored by the Ford Foundation, Mintstry of Food
snd Agriculture and Ministry of Community Development & Cooperation,
Government of India, April 1959,-5-
This study concluded that:
(1) The Third Plan target of 110 million tons
by 1965-66 would not be achieved with the
of food grains produced
existing set of programs;
rather a level of production of about 82 million tong waa more likely.












stabilization of farm prices at incentive levels;
A public works program for increasing food production
and village employment;
Greatly accehnated use of chemical fertilizers;
Intensification of irrigation and drainage programs;
Security of land tenure and land consolidation;
Large scale expansion of credit through cooperatives;
Progressive reduction in cattle numbers;
Creation of a more streamlined administrative mechanism




extension services down to the village
Selection of certain crops and certain areas which have the
greatest potential for increased production for intensive
agricultural development efforts,“6-’
Some of the recommendations of the”Food Crisis Report became the
basis for the Intensive Agricultural District Program (IADP)Q started
in 1960-61 and noted for its “package of practices” approach to agri-
cultural development. Subsequently an expanded, but modified, version
of the Intensive Agricultural District Program was extended to a much
~/
larger area under the name of the Intensive Agricultural Area Program.
It is abundantly clear that all the programs from the Intensive
Agricultural District Program to the New Agricultural Strategy placed
primary, but not exclusive, emphasis on increasing food grain production
as quickly as possible. And, this was to be accomplished by concentrating
efforts in those areas of the country (and indirectly on those farms) that
had the potential for rapid progress.
The reasons for this approach are equally evident. India was
gravely concerned in the early and mid-1960’s with food enouglh Many
felt, and with considerable justification, that the sharply rising prices
of food and the acute food shortages of the drought years 1965-66 and
~966-67 represented a serious impediment to economic progress, let
alone the social problems they created or helped to aggravate. It is all
too easy to forget with the passage of time the calamitous fall in food
grain production from 89 million tons in 1964-65 to 72 million tons in
1965-66, with only 74.2 million tons of food grains producal in 1966-07.
# Fourth Five Year Plan; 1968-74? Plannlng Cormnis~ion, Government
of India, 1970.-7-
lt is also easy to forget that the architects of the New Agricultural
Strategy, while consciously aware of the disparities which would be
created by concentrating increased agricultural production in
selected areas and on selected types of farms, were also concerned
with questions of equity, But these questions concerned the equity
of survival.
Now that the nation’s food situation has become more com-
fortable a new set of equity questions, rooted in the past but high-
lighted by the events of the times, has come to the forefront. Questions
of “equity” and “economic and social justice” are rapidly assuming
positions of pride-of-place in the hierarchy of concerns about rural
development.
More about this matter later. First, we should examine the
question of whether the New Agricultural Strategy has been successful
in achieving its stated objective -- increasing food gratn production
as quickly as possibIe,
Accomplishments
An examination of the. long-term trend in food grain production
indicates that production increased from 54.9 million tons in 1951 to
99.5 million tons in 1970, or at an annual rate of% 2 percent. This-8-
y
same growth rate also obtained in the 1951-65 period. !rhUS, the
rate of growth in food grain production during the period of the New
Agricultural 3trategy -- since 1965 -- enables only a continuation
of the past trend. And, some
of growth will prevail through
Should one interpret the
observers fee 1that the same rate
g/
the first half of the 1970’s.
pervasiveness of the trend rate of
growth in food grain production as a failure of the New Agricultural
Strategy ? It would appear from the aggregate food grain production
figures that the New Agricultural $trategy did not contribute much to
increasing production. But if one looks at the
~roduction quite a different picture emerges.
sources of growth in
Between 1951 and
1965 agricultural production grew at 3.1 percent per annum (3,2
percent for food grain). This mte of growth consisted of a 1.40
percent rate of growth in gross cropped area, a 1.33 percent rate
of growth in per acre productivity, and a 0.37 percent rate of growth
~/
due to changes in cropping patterns. Thus, nearly one-haIf of the
growth in agricultural output came from
under cultivation. The major expansion
the expansion of gross area
in cultivated area took place
B. S. Minhas, Fourth Plan: Objectives and Policy Frame, Commerce
Pamphlet 20-21, Vera and Co., Publishers, Private Ltd., Bombay,
India, Sept. 1969.
Report on Price Policy for Kharif Cereals for the 1970-71 Season,
Agricultural Prices Commission, Government of India, August 1970
Minhas, op. cit.-9-
in the 195O’s, Very little new cultivated land was brought into
production during the Third Plan Period (1961-66). And, net
cultivated area is expected to remain about constant in the Fourth
Plan period (1969-74). This means that continuance of the historical
rate of growth of agricultural and food grain production through the
1960’s reflects a sharply increased rate of growth in productivity
per acre, since essentially all of the increased output has come
from higher yields, more intensive use of land and changes in
cropping patterns. These observations are supported by what
has happened to the use of inputs, which may be just as good, if not
a better measure of progress in increasing agricultural output as
Q/
a direct measure of output itself. For example, fertilizer mnsump-
tion (N+P205+~O) increased from. 306,000 metric tons in 1960-61
to 1, 750, 000 metric tons in 1968-C9, During the same period the
number of electric and diesel pump-sets increased
1,688, 000 and the area covered by plant protection
U-!/
6.4 million hectares to 40 million hectares.
from 421, 000 to
measures from
fl/ Martin E. Abel, ~’Agriculture in India in the 1970~sfJ, Economic and
Political Weekly, Vol. V., No. 13, March 1970,
~/ A. My IKhusro, Agricultural Transformation in India, A,llied Publishers
Private Limited, 1969.
~ Fourth Five Year plant 1969-741 The planning Commission, Government
of India, 1970,.
-10-
One conclusion is clear: Without argui ng about the degree of
success -- targets vO. performance -- the New Agricultural Stratea
has accomplished in a significant way what it was designed to do; namelyz
increase food grain production qm“ckly beyond what would have been
.-
poseible without the high-yielding varieties, an expanded supply of inputs,
and a set of factors and product prices which make the use of these new
inputs profitable to farmers.
Regional distribution of benefits
The question still remains as to who has benefited from the
New Agricultural Strategy and where are those farmers located. Inspection
of data on food grain production at the national level (Table 1) indicates
that to date wheat has been at the forefront of accomplishments of the New
Agricultural Strategy, Of the 10.5 million ton increase in total food grain
production between 1965 and 1970, wheat alone accounted for 7.8 million
tons or about 75 percent. Rice, bajra and other cereals showed only
modest increases, while pulse production declined slightly and jowar
production showed virtually no change.
We next look at the geographic distribution of these changes in
production. Data are available’ for the crop years 1966-67, 1967-68,
and 1968-69 on the total acreage and acreage planted to high-
10a/
yielding varieties of wheat snd paddy, by States. — These are the
10a/ while one might question the accuracy of certain portfon~ of these
— data, the overall picture which emerges does not seem at all un-
reasonable.-11-
Tsble 1
Production of Woodgrains, India, 1951-1970





























































































































Source: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, NHnistry of 11’ood,
Agriculture, Community Development, and Cooperation.-12-
two ~iajor food grain crops; wheat showing a high rate of adoption
of high-yielding varieties and paddy showing only a modest rate
of adoption.
In the case of wheat there has been a very rapid expansion
in the area planted to high-yielding varieties (Tables 2a and 2b).
For all of Indl a, area of wheat planted to high yielding varieties
was 539.3 thousand hectares or only 4.3 percent of the total area
of wheat in 1966-67. B,ythe 1968-69 crop year the area under
high-yielding varieties had expanded to 4, 742.6 thousand hectares
or 30.5 percent of the total wheat area. Two States -- Punjab and
Uttar Pradesh -- accounted for 75 percent of the total area under
high yielding varieties of wheat, and in each of these States nearly
50 percent of wheat area was planted to high yieiding varieties,
This is a very rapid rate of adoption. There are other States in
which the substitution of high yielding varieties for local varieties
was rapid, but wheat area in these States is small; e.g. Assam,
Orissa, etc, There are a few States which have a modest area in
wheat production and where about 30 percent of the wheat area was
planted to high yielding varieties in 1968-69; e, g. Haryana and
Gujarat. Finally, there are States with rather sizeable area planted
to wheat where the area unde”r high-yielding varieties has increased
very slowly or only at a moderate rate; e, g. Madhya Pradesh,
Maharashtra, Rajasthan.-13-
Table 2a
Wheat: Total Area And High-Yielding Variety @YV) Area
by States and by Years, 1966-67 to 1968-69
State 1966-67 1967-68 1968-69

























































































TOTAL 12536.2 539.3 14649,6 2942,8 15553.8 4742.6
Source: Ministry of Food, Agriculture, C!ommunity Development and
Cooperation-14”
Table 2b
Percent of Wheat Area Planted to High-Yielding Varietieo, by States,
1966-67 to 1968-69




























































Production of Wheat by States, 1964-65 to 1968-69
State 1964-65 1965-66 1966-67 1%37-68 1968-69


































































Source: Ministry ofl?ood, Agriculture, Community Development, and
Cooperation.-16-
While a large number of the wheat producing States have
experienced some progress in the use of high-yielding varieties,
the bulk of the progress has been concentrated in a relatively few
States. In many wavs, this should not be an unexpected phenomenon.
The new varieties of wheat require, among other inputs, an adequate
and timely supply of water and under, rabi seasons this means irri
Thue, the new varieties have been grown where the irrigation faci
are located and also where irrigation could be ewded rapidly;
namely through tubewell development. This situation is basically
;ation,
ities
consistent with one of the objectives of the new agricultural strategy;
namely, concentrate the production of high-yielding varieties on land
with an assured water supply. We should keep in mind, however, that
it was economic forces rather than administrative pressures that led
to this pattern of production; farmers produced the new varieties of
wheat where it was profitable and the,y had the resources to do so.
The growth in production of high-yielding varieties of rice in many
ways stands in sharp contrast to that of wheat (Tables 3a, 3b). As of
1963-69 only 7,8 percent of the total rice area was planted to high-yield-
ing varieties of rice. While some progress has been made with growing
high-yielding varieties of rice in almost all States, none, with the
exception of Jammu and Kashmir, has reached the intensity of use of
the new seeds that characterizes U, 1?. and Punjab in the case of wheat,
Only TamiI IWdu and Kerala seem to be making reasonably good progress-17-
Table 3a
Paddy: Total Area And High-Yielding Variety (HYV) Area
By States and by Years 1966-67 to 1968-69
State 1966-67 1967-68 1968-69
‘Total HYV Total WV Total HYV
































































































TOTAL 34522.4 882.7 35703.6 1764.1 36211.5 2866.7
$ouroe: Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Community Development, and Cooperation.-18-
Table 3b
Percent of Paddy Area Planted to High-Yielding Varieties, by States,
1966-6? to 1968-1969



































































TOTAL 2.6 4.9 7.9-19-
Table 3C
Production of Rice by States, 1964-65 to1968-69 by Year
(In thousands)
.




















5006.9 3961,4 4852.8 4673.8 4340.5
1920,0 1847.4 1756.3 1979.8 2250.8
4913.7 4262.0 1645.2 4731.6 5197.4
471,0 247.4 294.3 463.5 230.0
264.6 204.0 223.0 287.0 265.0
207,9 160.5 256. ? 279.6 487.3
1121.4 997,5 1084.1 112309 1400.0
3505.7 1700.6 1910.3 3192.8 3004, 6
1454,6 893.4 1065.0 1437.3 1368.8
1750, 8 1159.7 1636.2 1796.9 2001.1
42.8 43.2 50.0 51.0 52.9
4420.2 3285.4 3691.6 3?55. 5 4698.6
351.0 296.0 338.0 415.0 460,0
98.4 23, 5 21.6 95,3 57.0
4036.1 3709.4 4076.4 4115.6 3940.0
3323.4 2342,0 2913.1 3262.1 2922.1
5760.6 4893.1 4824.3 5208.2 6250.0
39307.8 30655.1 30437.9 37612.2 39761,2-20-
in spreading the use of high-yielding rice varieties with 24.8and
23.8 percentof the total rice area in each respective St@ebeing
w
covered in 1968-69; ‘Andhra Pradesh ranks ncmtwith 16.6 percent
of its rice area under-yielding varieties. While there appears tobe
Iess State-wise concentration in the production ofhigh-yielding






Some of the basic reasons for the slower rate of adoption of
high-yielding varieties of rice than wheat are well understood. In
most of the rice producing areas dependent only upon monsoon rains
or receiving water under
there is a lack of control
unregu Iated canal or tank irrigation systems,
-- either too much or too little -- in water use,
a critical requirement if the full yield potential of the new rice varieties
is to be realized. Furthermore, insect and disease problems are
more prevalent under conditions of heavy cloud cover and relatively
low intensity of sunlight that prevail during the monsoon season. In
additio q the reduced availability of solar energy due to heavy cloud
cover reduces yields, Economic factors may also be important,
such as the lower price received for the high yielding varieties of rice.
~ We should keep in mind that two important varieties in these States
are not truly high-yielding varieties, but improved local varieties
-- ADT 27 and C-28.-21-
The high-yielding varieties of rice do much better during the non-
monsoon seasons under irrigation. But, the amount of land with
such irrigation is as yet very small.
There has been a range of experience with other cereal grains.
High-yielding varieties of baj ra are being planted on an increased area
and there is a modest upward trend in total production (Table 1). In the
case of high-yielding varieties of jowar, disease and insect problems
as well as problen. s of consumer acceptability have retarded their
adoption and there has been no apparent growth in total jowar produc-
tion durin~ the decade of the 1960’s. Among the different cereals, high-
yielding varieties of maize were among the first to be developed and
adopted in India. There has been continued growth in the use of these
varieties, However, they are not without their serious problems and,
for example, area planted to high-yielding varieties of maize has
declined in recent years in
decline are higher costs of
quality, etc.
4?/
the Punjab. Some of the reasons for this
production, lower prices, variations in seed
To summarize: The New Agricultural Strategy was designed
get rapid increases in food grain production. New high-yielding
to
varieties together with fertilizers and plant protection materials were
to be concentrated on areas with assured water supply. Within the
Q/ H. S. Sandhu and S. S. Johl, Performance of Maize Crop in Punjab
~1967-68 through 1969-70), Department of Economics and %ciology,
Punjab Agricultural University, Ludhiana.limits of available technology,
It has happened more so in the
-22-
this is what more or loss has happened..
cam of wheat than that of rice for
reasons already discussed; the experience with other food grains
has been mixed with bajra showing probably the most promising
results to date. Continuod research in plant breeding will bring forth
still better varieties of food grains adapted to local ecological
conditions. Continued improvement in water nianagement will also
occur, but with many large-scale problems yet to be solved. There
will undoubtedly be continued tubewoll development in the (kngetic
Plain, constrained, however, by the availability of power, pumpsets,
credit, etc. , and very likely by insufficient knowledge about the
quantitative and qualitative adequacy of ground water supplied.
Improvement of irrigation systems to bring better control of water
use to individual farmer’s fields and to make the systems more
responsive to agricultural requirements in the rice areas will be a
long-term effort. But as this effort is made as well as further
improvements in rice varieties, we will see the continued spread of
high-,yielding rice varieties.
Distribution of benefits by size of farm
So far we have discussed the differential impact of the New
A~ricultural Strategy on different areas of the country. We turn now to
the question of how different groups of farmers have been able to benefit-23-
from thenewhigh-yielding varieties- specificall~ namely, how it has
benefited farms of different sizes,
13/
In a recent article, — l?, K, Mukherjee presents some data from the
Plan Evaluation organization’s study of the Hlgh-Yielding Variety Program
in 1968-69. The data are for three States (Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, and
l%njab) and for three food grains (paddy, jowar, and wheat). The
percentage distribution of cultivators in each size-of-farm category
in the sample growing high-yielding varieties of the three food grains
is presented in Table 4.
The data for wheat in the sample of villages in the Punjab again
confirms how successful these new varieties have been. Not only did
98.28 percent of the cultivators in the samiple grow high-yielding
varieties of wheat, but the distribution of the proportion of cultivators
growing the new varieties ranged from. 96.77 to 100.00 percent, In
this sample, both small and large cultivators alike have benefited.
For paddy in Tamil Nadu, 58 and 72 percent of the cultivators in the
sample grew high-yielding varieties in the rabi and kharif seasons,
.
respectively. During the kharif season, 70 percent of the smallest
cultivators grew the new varieties compared with 100 percent of the
13/ P. K. hfukherjee, “The HYV Programme; Variables that Matter”,
Economic and Political Weekly , Review of Agriculture, Vol. V,
No. 3, March 28, 1970.-24-
Table 4
Proportion of Cultivators Growing High-Yielding Varieties by Size of
Operational Holdings
Ei$!Qx Jowar Wheat
Size of (Tarnil Nadu) (Maii=htra) (Punjab)
holding Kharif Rabi Kharff Xtabi Rabi
1968 1968- 1968 1968- 1968-
1969 1969 1969
(acres) --------------------percent ---------------------------
Below 2.5 70.33 52,36 9.43 7.20 96.77
2. 5-4,9 68.48 60, 82 26.36 8.06 98,67
!5.0-9.9 74*~g 69.40 23.08 8.08 97.74
10 -19,9 82,35 69.70 19.15 11*91 98.65
20 -49.9 95.23 100.00 29,37 17.70 98.45
W & above 100.00 100.00 53.33 19.12 100.00
All SiZ@S 72.09 57.70 23.17 13.65 98.28
P.K. Mukherjee, ‘The HYV Programme; Variables That Matter”,
Economic and Political Weeklyf Review of Ag~icuRure, Vol. V,
No, 3, March 28, 1970.-25-
largest cultivators; the comparable figures forrabi paddy are52 and
100percent. In the case of jowar in Maharashtra, 23 percent of the
cultivators grew the high-yielding varieties in the ldmrif season, but
only 11percent did 30 in the rabi season. The range from smallest to
lar~est cultivators was from 9 to 53 percent in the kharif season and
frou. 7 to 19percent during the rabi season,
While the small farmers seemed to benefit nearly as much as
the large farmers from the new varieties of wheat, this was not so in
the case of paddy and especially not in the case for jowar. Even for
wheat, the data for the Punjab may show overly optimistic results for
wheat as a whole. As we saw in Tables 2a and 2b, Punjab had the
highest rate of adop+!on of the high-yielding varieties of wheat. The
data indicate that the pre-conditions for the profitable use of the new
wheat varieties, namely adequate irrigation, were present on a large
scale and widely distributed. This may not be the case in other
States. And, if irrigation, for example, is not as uniformly distributed
among farms of different sizes, one would expect a less even distribution
of the use of the new wheat varieties among farm-size groups. The
Plan Evaluation Organization is presently engaged in a comprehensive
studv of three years of experience with the high-yielding varieties of
wheat, paddy, jowar,
what this study shows
discussed above.
bajra, and maize and it will be interesting to see
for States and food grains other than ones-26-
At this point, it is worth discussing an important economic
a~pect of New Agricultural Strategy; namely, that the main components
of the new approach form a biological-chemical element of new
technology which is neutral with respect to economics of scale or farmi
size. The chemical-biological element consists of the new seeds and
chmuical fertilizers. Since these inputs are perfectly divisible,
there is no reason why significant scale factors should exist.
Therefore, small as well as large faru.ers should get proportionately
the same benefits fro~i the new technology, The experience of Japan
and Taiwan are cited to support this proposition.
While this analysis of the impact of the new technology on farms
of different sizes is correct, it is at best a partial evaluation. For
the neutrality-of-scale argument to be generally true, there would
have to be an absence of scale economies with respect to all the other
supporting inputs required for farmers to realize the full economic
potential of the new high yielding varieties, This may or may not be
the case. There are several important supporting inputm which are
available to farmers either w.ainly in terms of lumpy or discrete
investments or through institutional structures which favor large
smali farmers, both of which give rise to scale economies with
respect to the use of these inputs. Privateiy owned tubeweiis
over-27-
represent one form of lumpy investment giving rise to scale economies
in the use of high-yielding varieties where irrigation is important. Of
course, there are forms of economic organization such as joint
investments in
can reduce the
tubewell development by several small farmers which
lurripiness of this type of investnient ts the individual
farmer, the same result can also be achieved through the sale of water
to s~ialler farmers by larger ones at reasonable rates. However, this”
form of economic organization is still the c$xception, rather than the
rule, With respect to institutional structures which favor larger over
smaller farmers, the credit system represents one example among
many, It is no secret that generally larger farmers have access to
proportionately n,ore borrowed capital on easier terms than do small
ones, both because of their economic as well as social position within
the community. w Here again, there are alternative institutional
arrangements which are loss biased with respect to size of farm, but
they too are probably in the minority at the present time.
14/ C. H. Hanumantha Rae, “Farm Size and ‘lredit Policy”, —
Economic and Po~itical Weekly, Review of Agriculture,
VOI.5, No.52., December 26, 1970.-28-
In subsequent sections ofthis paper wo discuss measures
required to more fully take advant ago of the neutrality-of-scale
characteristic of the new chemical-biological technology. As will
be discussed, these measures li~ mostly beyond the pale of the
New Agricultural Strategy,
Potential of the New Agricultural Strategy for Dealing with Problems
of Income Distribution and Employment
Now that the problems of income distribution and enlployment
in rural India have become much more important relative to the
problems of self-sufficiency in food and fiber production, it is worth
examining to what extent the New Agricultural Strategy as defined in
this paper can contribute to the solutions of these problems.
One obvious extension of the New Agricultural Strategy is to
achieve further varietal improvements in food grains which will make
them economically superior to local varieties and spread their adoption
within the present physical and economic environment. This means,
for example, further research work to develop varieties of paddy and
jowar which are more resistant to prevailing insects and diseases and
can yield higher rates of return to farmers under existing conditions
of production. It also means that no single variety will be best for all
of India; numerous varieties will have to bc developed and adapted to
.-29-
the variations in production conditions, area by area. Success in
these endeavors will result in a wider geographic coverage of the new
technologies represented by the high+yielding varieties, It may also
have some impact on the distribution of benefits of the new technology
among farms of different size. This would occur to the extent the
physical and economic risk associated with some of the less adapted
high-yielding varieties was significantly reduced and, as a
consequence, made them more attractive to small farmers. This
assertion assumes that small farmers are less able and less willing
to adopt high-risk technology relative to larger farmers. While there
is no conclusive evidence to fully support this assumption, there is
a significant amount of evidence to indicate the larger farmers do have
more management skills, access to information, and financial
resources to adopt risky, yet profitable new practices than is true for
small ones.
Beyond varietal improvement of food grains the things that
need to be done fall outside of the framework of the New Agricultural
Strategy, as defined, They involve three basic sets of program and
policy decisions: The first is to strengthen programs of varietal
improvement for commodities other than food grains -- other food
and non-food crops. Second, more emphqsis should be put on-30-
agricultural pursuits other than crop production -- animal husbandry
and forestry. And third, wore effort will have to be devoted to
improving the physical, economic and institutional “environment”
for crop production to more fully exploit the yield potentiai of
improved crop varieties over wider geographic areas and among
farms of various sizes by providing required inputs in adequate
quantities to all sizes of farina.
Broader Program of Varietal Improvement and Production
The main thrust of the New Agricultural Strategy has been to
increase the yield performance and production of food grains. Whilo
some new varieties contain some serious weaknesses which have
prevented more rapid adoption, research efforts are underway to
correot these deficiencies. When we turn from food grains to other
food crops and to non-food crops, the prospects are less promising.
A “Green Revolution” is not in sight for such crops as cotton, (although
varietal improvement is taking place) oil seeds, pulses, and some
horticultural and vegetable items, Yet some of these commodities
represent major sources of incomes for large agricultural areas of
India. Intensified efforts to improve yields and expand production of
these commodities will bring added income and employment to many
areas that have not yet benefited much from the New Agricultural Strategy.-31-
Livestock and Fore~try
Insufficient attention has also been paid to such rural pursuits
as iivesto ck and forestry. Not only are research and technological
considerations involved, but also investment decisions in production,
processing and marketing commensurate with the growing demands.
The future development of the livestock and forest. product industries
have important implications for bringing new employment and income
opportunities to areas that have not and are not likely to benefit much
from the New Agricultural Strategy. In addition, these industries
offer opportunities for increasing employment and incomes of small
farmers and landless labor. The impact of livestock development on
the economic well-being of small farmers can be illustrated by the way
in which an organized system of ~,ilk marketing in Kaira district,
Gujarat, has made possible a significant source of non-crop income for
small farmers in that area. However, to reproduce this experience
in other areas may require some new innovations in institution building.
Ireproving the Production Environment
One of the signal characteristics of the cew high-yielding varieties
of foal grains, which form the basis of the New Agricultural Strategy,
is that their performance is sensitive to the physical (and economic)
environment in which they are grown, The new varieties of wheat and
rice were bred to achieve a high response to heavy application of-32-
fertilizer. A concomitant factor in the realization of the high yield
potontial of these varieties is the availability of water in ccrrect
amounts and on a timely baois. This means a high degree of water
control involving both controlled application of water and drainage
systems capable of removing excess water. In addition, disease
and insect problems will have to be made manageable whether
through control of these problems in ways that are external to the
varieties or by developing better inherent resistance in the plant.
In a study of the performance of the high-yielding varieties of
1#
rice and wheat in Asia, Barker concludes that:
“Data have been presented to support the hypothesis that
differences in environmental conditions and not farmer’s
ability or knowledge have been responsible for the out-
standing performance of the new wheat as compared with
the new rice varieties. The typical environmental conditions
under which the two crops arc grown differ markedly. The
production functions suggested that the potential response
of the high yielding rice varieties is equal to that for the new
wheat varieties under the same environmental condition.
However, given the difference in growing conditions for dry
climate wheat and r~ce as compared with rice in the monsoon,
not only the degree of response but the year-to-year variabili~
in response must influence the farmer’s willingness to apply
inputs. The wide differences that can be observed in produc-
tion gains to date give support to the importance of the
environment,
“Acceptance of the above hypothesis has important policy
implications for Asian Countries. Sustained gains in rice
IQ/ Randolph Barker, Environmental Factors Influencing the Performance
of New High Yieldi ng Varieties of Wheat and Rice in Asiaa Interna-
tional Rice Research Institute, Los Banes, Philippines (mimw. )-33-
production c,anbe achieved principally by reducing the risk
and uncertainty facing farmcrs, Continued effort will be
required to improve and expand irrigation and drainage
facilities. At the same time, more attention will ned to
be given to im.provemcmt of production potential under
rainfed and upland conditions. It will be necessary to
invest adequate research funds in the development of in-
sect and disease resistant varieties. Resistant varieties
for the long run appear to offer a more fruitful approach
than emphasis on ins~cticides which for the individual
farmers are expensive and offer uncertain benefits. “
Barker’s conclusions caIl for two lines of action. On the question of
disease and insect problems, researchers should try to build as much
r soi stance into high yieldf~ varieties as is practicable. This is
clearly within the purview of the New Agricultural Strategy. So
too would be the further development of food grain varieties suitable
to rainfed areas. On the other hand, development of water resources
through irrigation and drainoge programs which would yield a high
degree of water control on farmers’ fields represent$ an extremely
large area of program activity that falls outside tho framework of the
New Agricultural Strategy. Yet the water factor represents one of the
major restraints not only on total agricultural production, but also
on spreading the benefits of tho New Agricultural Strategy ever larger
areas and among different size-groups of farmers. For example, a
recent study by U. P. Agricultural University of recent changes in the
agriculture of two areas in Western U. P. States that “Irrigation
deficiencies remained Substantial ,.. and certainly critical for the-34-
g/
small, medium and very small cultivators.’~ This conclusion has
17/
also been substantial ed in a study of small farmers in Gujarat.
In addition to the physical environment one has also to consider
the social and econouiic environment within which farmers operate,
particularly the small farmers and those with tenuous relations to
th~ land they farm. The New Agricultural Strategy has dramatized
many inherent inequities in the rural institutional structure which
have been present for a very long period.
“It is not. ., the new technology which is the primary cause of
the accentuated imbalances in the countryside. It is not the
fault of the new technology that the credit service does not
serve those for whom it was originally intended; that the
extension services are not living up to expectations, that
the panchayats are political rather than developmental bodies;
that security of tenure is a luxury of the few; that rents are
exorbitant; that ceilings on agricultural land are national;
that for the greater part tenurial legislation is deliberately
miscarried; or that wage stales are hardly sufficient to keep
soul and body together. ” Q/
Changing Agriculture in Two Regions of Uttar Pradesh --1969-70,
Preliminary Report, Agro-Economic Regional Survey No. 2,
U. P, Agricultural University, Pantnagar, U.P., November 197(
V. S. Vyas, D. S. Tyagi, and V. N. Misra, Significance of the
New Strategy of Agricultural Development for Small Farmers ~
A Cross Sectional Study of Two Areas of Gujarat~ Agro-Econom:
Research Centre, Sardar Patel University, Vallabh Vidyanagar,
1969.
Wolf Ladej insky, “Green Revolution in 13ihar -- The Kosi Area;




Again, it is clear that the Flew Agricultural Strategy was not designed
to reduce or eliminate the inherent inequities in the rural institutional
structure, nor is it capable of doing so. Something much more in the
way of development progran.s will be needed,
Something More is Needed
That the New Agricultural Strategy did not have as its main
goal the achievement of a more equitable distribution in rural India
is clear, It is also clear that the New Agricultural Strategy, as
defined, has only limited potentials for dealing with the major problem
of inequable distribution of income. Therefore, something much more
is needed.
Undoubtedly, the New Agricultural Strategy, in tho areas in
whid it has had an impact, has contributed something to increasing
ernployn. ent and incomes of the small farmer and landless laborers.
And, with further improvements in certain ekxrients of the strategy,
such as improving the adaptability of some high-yielding varieties
of food grains, more can be accomplished, However, we have also
seen that there are major restraints operating on the spread of the
new technology. Among the more important of these are the improve-
ment of water manageriment -- achieving a higher degree of water control
on farn,ers’ fields through extension and improvement of irrigation
facilities as well as making better use of surface water in rainfed areas-36-
.
.
with limited potential for irrigation, These are complex, long-term,
and costly activities involving programs outside the present scope of
the New Agricultural Strategy. .
When we talk about a more equitable level of income distribu -
tion we are really talking about reducing or eliminating the grinding
poverty in rural India. How big and how widespread is this problem?
~g[
A recent study by Bardhan estimates the number of people living
in poverty in rural India in the late 1960’s (1967-68) to be about
225 million. Poverty is defined as a monthly income of Rs. 15
per month per person in terms of 1960-61 prices, An even more
disconcerting aspect of the results of the study is that the percentage
of the total rural population living in poverty increased from 38
percent in 1960-61 to 53 percent in 1967-68, The magnitude of this
change in the 1960’s varied among States from virtually no change
iq percent of the rural population living in poverty in Orissa, Jammu
and Kashmir, Andhra Pradesh and Kerala to a near tripling of the
proportion in West Bengal -- from. 22 percent in 1960-61 to 61
percent in 1967-68. The evidence strongly suggests that an already
bad situation has been getting steadily worse. A recent study by
KJ/ l?rmmb Bardlhw, “Green Revolution and Agricultural Laborers”,
Political and Ekonomic Weekly, Vol V, Nos 29-31, Special No.
July 1970; and Pranab Bardhan, “Green Revolution & Agricultural
Labourers; A Correction”, Political & Economic Weekly, Vol. V,
No. 46, November 14, 1970.,
-37”
~/
Dandekar and Rath has quantified the magnitude of rural poverty
(using the sanm income criteria as Bardhan) in India likely to prevail
in the 1970’s. They estimate that it will take resources valued at
nearly Rs. 1, 000 crores annually to eliminate poverty from rural
India.
Several measures to deal with rural poverty and reducing the
imbalances in rural income have been formulated as programs or
proposed as possible program activities. Each of these directs its
fows specifically to the problem of poverty and what can be done about
it. Each also has other objectives related to increasing agricultural
output and rural employment generally. However, the output objective
is’ not given major weight in terms of national objectives; it is considered
very important as a means of improving the econou.ic well-being of
certain segments of the rural poor who have opportunities to farm and
expand their production.
Governnient has initiated a program to assist in developing the
production and income potential of small farmers and to provide additional
employment to landless laborers. This program will operate through the
Small Farmers Developnmnt Agency with programs in some 46 districts
20/ V. M. Dandekar and Nilkantha Rath, Poverty in Indiat the Ford Foundation
Ncw Delhi, January 1970, and printed in The Economic and Political
XS@!Yl Vol” VI* Nc’~”1 & 2$ January1971-38-
during the Fourth Plan, and similar administrative agencies will be
2J
in charge of programs for marginal farmers and landless laborers.
Assistance to increase production will be provided to potentially
viable farmers (those who could earn a minimally acceptable level
Qi’income from
landless labor,
farming). For those operating marginal farms and
assistance will be provided through fostering supple-
mental occupations and non-farm employment opportunities. ‘
The estimated resources available during the Fourth Plan for
the program of the Small Farmer Development Agency to help potentially
viable farmers are as IOI1OWQ: IW. 115 crores of direct financial support
from the Plan; and Rs. 90 crores of short-term credit per annum and
Rs. 170 crores of medium- and long-term credit during the Plan period
from various financial institutions. The estimated resources avaikkde
@ generating supplemental occupations and non-farm employment for
the very small farmers and landless labor is estimated to be Rs. 10 crores
of short-term credit per annum and Rs. 30 crores of medium and long-
term credit per annum.
~ti For a description of the progrnm see B. Venkatappiah, Umall Farmers
Development Agency: Outline of a Programme of Action, paper presented
at the 29th Annual Conference of the Indian Society of Agricultural Economics,
Waltair, December 30, 1969; and Fourth Five Year Plan 1969-74, Planning
Commission, Government of India, 1970.-39-
WhiIe these programs arc steps in the right direction, it must
berecognized that they arermdest efforts, indeed, compared with
the magnitude of the employment and poverty problems in rural India
22/
as estimated by Dandekar and Itath. — And, while increased agricul-
tural production resulting from the New Agricultural Strategy and
some measures of land reforms will help to increase employment
opportunist ies for the rural poor, these efforts will not be nearly
enough to defil with the poverty problem. Therefore, a
of rural employment designed to permanently withdraw
major program
[abor fror~.
agriculture is required. This labor could be used to generate capital
required for niore rapid development of agriculture and rural areas
.- iniprovement and extension of a variety of irrigation measures,
soil conservation, rural roads, marketing and storage facilities,
g/




V. M. Dandckar and DJilkantha Rath, op. cit,
This approach is by no means new. See illartin E. Abel,
l!Agricultur~ in India in the 1970’s”, Political and Economic
Weekly, Review of Agriculture, VQ1. V, No. 13, March 1970,
for references to earlier writings on the subject.-40-
Qonclusions
The Ncw Agricultural Strategy has been quite successful in
achieving what it was designed to do; namely, achieve a rapid increase
in total food grain production, It now seems soriiewhat unjust to
criticise this approach for not bringing the benefits of the “Green
Revolution” to certain areas of the country and classes of rural
people when, in fact, it was not a major objective of the programs.
Rather, attention should be focused directly on the problems of
income distribution and poverty in rural India and what is required
to bring about significant improvement in these problem areas.
Care should be taken not to undermine the tcclmologi cd basis for
increasing agricultural production in the push to achieve a better
distribution of incm..c, As it n]ay turn out, programs for alleviating
rural poverty al w) can be highly supportive of spreading the benefits
of the New Agricultural Strategy and increasing agricultural production.